6 Oct 2010

FED, Krugman and real negaitve interest rates

Todays move down in real interest rates on TIPS is taken right out of Krugman's "Japan's Trap" from May 1998. Today real interest rates out to 7 year went negative. 10 yr real yield is now down 50bp since FOMC on September 21.



The way to make monetary policy effective, then, is for the central bank to credibly promise to be irresponsible - to make a persuasive case that it will permit inflation to occur, thereby producing the negative real interest rates the economy needs.


This sounds funny as well as perverse. Bear in mind, however, that the basic premise - that even a zero nominal interest rate is not enough to produce sufficient aggregate demand - is not hypothetical: it is a simple fact about Japan right now. Unless one can make a convincing case that structural reform or fiscal expansion will provide the necessary demand, the only way to expand the economy is to reduce the real interest rate; and the only way to do that is to create expectations of inflation.



Today's move



Real yield changes since September 21 FOMC


TIPS FOMC Day Part II

9 Jun 2010

Not easy to be a Spanish or Italian pension fund

It has been a very difficult quarter for financial markets so far and the focus is very much the problems with southern European fiscal imbalances and lack of growth and the effect on the banking sector, but how is it to be a pension fund?


Unless a pension fund had a very positive funded status (very unlikely) at the end of Q1 they will all by now be deeply under water as is illustrated with two simple examples assuming a marked -to-market of both assets and liabilities. It is assumed that the pension fund is invested in domestic assets and that the liabilities NPV is measured by using a 30 yr EURO swap rate.



This Spanish pension fund began with a 10% positive funded status at the beginning of Q2, now it is negative by 16%


For the Italian pension fund the same 10% positive funding is now negative 8% as can be seen below:



The asset side assumption of 100% domestic investment is probably worst case, but on the other hand some funds could have larger equity allocations etc.


On the liability side using a blended curve from domestic government bonds and Euro swaps would also give a better outcome.


Whatever the assumptions it should be pretty clear that the situation for southern European pension funds is as bleak as for the banks and will play into and complicate the Euro-zone endgame coming up

30 Dec 2009

The Year End Rally Arrived, What Now?

Looking back its amazing how the overall market picture of S&P in 2009 matches the moves in 2003, so its no surprise that the year ended with more of the same ...



Looking into 2010 will financial markets follow the scripts of 1993/1994 or 2003/2004 or something total different considering that the circumstances are very different now.


The three market scenarios we work with in Limus Capital for 2010 are:



  • Sweet spot

  • V-Shape

  • Crisis 2.0 (Double Dip)



Interest rates in the US and to some degree in Europe have gone up in December following the better than expected US NFP early in the month. A key question is if the move is a V-Shape inspired move or a Crisis 2.0 move as bond vigilantes are giving up on countries with too large fiscal deficits and funding requirements.


In any case the next US NFP on January 8 will be very important for fixed income and therefore also equities if the experience from 1993/94 and 2003/2004 will carry any weight in 2010. The 1993/94 are more in the V-shape camp whereas 2003/04 would be more like a Sweet spot


A 1993/1994 replay:




In 1994 the key driver for the move was the surprising rate hike from FED in early February 1994 which we very likely will not get this year. But anyway one good January was what we got in 1994 before equities fell.


A 2003/2004 replay:




In 2004 the equity rally from 2003 carried two months into the year before some fatigue hit the market late in Q1. As in a potential Sweet spot scenario for 2010 the equity rally early in the year was supported by positive fixed income markets. S&P did move in a very narrow range in the first half of 2004.



Considering the starting point for 2010 the odds are very high that the development in 2010 will have much less comparison to an other time period that what we saw in 2009 that looked so much like 2003. But one thing for sure is that the development in sovereign bond yields could go a long way in shaping financial markets in 2010.

23 Nov 2009

S&P 500 2003 Year-end Replay

In 2003 we had a year end rally that began on November 20 after a minor correction. Will the low on Friday on November 20 also mark the beginning of a year end rally ?



The S&P future charts looks set to break-out above 1110 which is very close.




On the other hand the EuroStoxx charts looks a liltle bit more like a top formation and have also underperformed S&P lately.



The same can be said about Russel 2000.


11 Nov 2009

Not all bubbles present a risk to the economy

These days you read many stupid things, but this one is getting the price for the week. According to Mishkin in yesterdays FT there is a difference between a "Credit boom bubble" and an "pure irrational exuberance bubble".


His "proof" for this is:



For example, the bubble in technology stocks in the late 1990s was not fuelled by a feedback loop between bank lending and rising equity values; indeed, the bursting of the tech-stock bubble was not accompanied by a marked deterioration in bank balance sheets. This is one of the key reasons that the bursting of the bubble was followed by a relatively mild recession. Similarly, the bubble that burst in the stock market in 1987 did not put the financial system under great stress and the economy fared well in its aftermath.



So the fact that we had a mild recession in 2001/2002 have nothing to do with the very loose monetary policy in the after match laying the foundation for the current economic and financial crisis. Nice for the central bankers to have a "good academic" argument for keeping interest rates low for en extended period to support higher equity markets ....

8 Nov 2009

IMF also supports the "Better late than early" doctrine in a memo presented at G20


Principle 1. The timing of exits should depend on the state of the economy and the financial system, and should err on the side of further supporting demand and financial repair.

and even gets into "Pigs can fly" thinking process...


Principle 2. With some exceptions, fiscal consolidation should be a top policy priority. Monetary policy can adjust more flexibly when normalization is needed.


Principle 3. Fiscal exit strategies should be transparent, comprehensive, and communicated clearly now, with the goal of lowering public debt to prudent levels within a clearly-specified timeframe.


But also says that rates can be raised before unconventional elements are removed ...


Principle 5. Unconventional monetary policy does not necessarily have to be unwound before conventional monetary policy is tightened.


Also clear that that exit strategies are not for next week ...


Principle 6. Economic conditions, the stability of financial markets, and market-based mechanisms should determine when and how financial policy support is removed.